A politically contentious issue, climate change-related migration suffers from ambivalent recognition in many forums, including in legal, political, and international negotiations. The existence of the climate change migration phe nomenon, however, at least for the kinds of relocation typical of small island atoll communities in the Pacific, is credible and verifiable.1 Indeed, a number of com munities are already well into the process of relocation-and for each, durable solutions are critical.2
This article focuses on the relocation difficulties facing communities that are currently moving as a result of climate forces, specifically in Papua New Guinea (PNG). A review of their plight reveals that two important gaps in assistance com pound the inherent challenges of relocation and cause the nagging lack of funding for climate change action, generally, and adaptation, specifically. These gaps are either economic development gaps-in which communities cannot address redevel opment needs that, because they are neither strictly "climate" nor "development," elude appropriate classification for funding-and political gaps-in which existing funding is inaccessible for local communities that are at odds with the national governments charged with representing their interests. This article first provides a brief back ground on the contested phenomenon of climate-induced migration and then looks at the specific instances of planned reloca tion in the South Pacific. Extrapolating from concerns of the Carteret Islanders of PNG, this article later explores the gaps in research and management that hamper relocation and may adversely affect suc cessful, long-term resettlement. In the final part, it considers the perils and pos sibilities of current funding regimes and explores possible amendments to improve the odds of success for relocating communities. Considering sound models for a new framework, this article explores the applicability of existing, though smaller, community-oriented funding regimes and community-based adaptation generally as a paradigmatic framework to address the political and economic development challenges that climate migrants face.
There exists significant controversy regarding the ability to attribute the decision of indi viduals to leave their homes permanently and relocate due to climate change.
MIGRATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
While the movement of peoples as a result of climate change-induced pressures may be difficult to predict and clearly identify, certain types of movement are more straightforward than others. Because of the generally multi-causal nature of migra tion, there exists significant controversy regarding the ability to attribute the deci sion of individuals to leave their homes permanently and relocate due to climate change.3 The uncertainties regarding the extent and magnitude of the changing climate, the elusiveness of a credible and consistent number of possible migrants, and the absence of a clear legal status and framework for those who might moveparticularly across borders-compound the attribution uncertainties. The migra tion of small islanders due to sea-level rise, coupled with more devastating storm surges and king tides, however, is more certain.4 Accordingly, researchers and climate migration skeptics have largely excluded this category of migrants from the more general and contentious debates surrounding the relationship between climate and migration or dislocation.5
Throughout the Pacific, efforts to relocate communities are currently underway that highlight the need for effective management and funding. Recognizing the existential threat to its territory and people, Kiribati has been developing a reloca tion policy it calls "migration with dignity."6 The president of Kiribati has recently purchased arable land in Fiji to assist with food production, which is currently compromised in Kiribati by climate-related saltwater intrusion.7 That land will also serve as a place to relocate some, if not all, of its citizens when it becomes necessary.8 In the Solomon Islands, Choiseul-a township of about 1,000 people on Taro Island-lies less than two meters above sea level and is the first provincial capital in the Pacific to orchestrate a relocation with all of its services and facili ties to be moved.9 Threatened by storm surges and rising seas, and eager to move swiftly, the community consulted a team of engineers, scientists, and planners, and decided that, while implementing disaster prevention measures in the near term, it would concurrently construct a new town on an adjacent mainland and move communities in stages.10
While many hail the Choiseul relocation as a model for other provinces across the nation and the Pacific, there are remaining funding and management needs for a successful transition." For this township and similarly situated communities, a variety of challenges face both those moving and the communities receiving them. The most common risks associated with displacement and resettlement processes include: landlessness, unemployment, homelessness, marginalization, food insecu rity, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration.
The lessons drawn from resettlements and planned relocations thus far-most notably in the Carteret Islands of PNG-might help to ensure the most successful resettlement for communities that must relocate. Some 2,000 Carteret Islanders are in the midst of permanently resettling from their tiny islets in the Carteret Atoll to mainland Bougainville. Separated by a three-hour boat ride, the move to the mainland marks a significant departure for the islanders and an unprecedented challenge for the national and international infrastructure that must now fund and manage this kind of move.12 In addition to coping with the devastation of the atoll due to rising seas, saltwater intrusion in freshwater wells and taro fields, an unprec edented occurrence and intensity of king tides, and accompanying erosion of culture for the "taro people," islanders have suffered from their own government's resistance to act and a lack of assistance from the international community. 13 In response, the Council of Elders initiated a plan for resettlement. Coordinating the move since 2006, Ursula Rakova is leading the permanent resettlement to Bougainville and, most importantly, attempting to ensure that the islanders will be self-reliant in their new home. 14 The move toward self-reliance has been contingent not only on the removal of obstacles presented by various layers of government, including the national government, but also on the delivery of an adequate and more expansive view encumbered poorly endowed community-based efforts and stymied swift and effective strategies to relocate.17 According to Rakova, donors objected to the first set of homes built, arguing for cheaper, less resilient houses. Furthermore, tens of PNG could not be used for house construction, as it did not conform to prescribed categories for climate aid. 18 The Carteret Islanders' experience vis-a-vis funding is not unusual, yet ade quate funding is absolutely essential to address the challenges of climate-induced relocation. 19 It not only facilitates the necessary studies for proper planning, but also supports participatory processes critical for community engagement and, hopefully, a successful resettlement process with dignity and long-term self-reli ance at its core. of climate-related funding. To craft their eighteenstep process-including community profiling and assessment, which resulted in the islanders owning land, initiating home building, and exploring sus tainable economic development-Rakova relied on small amounts of seed money from the New Zealand Fligh Commission in PNG and the nonprofit, Global Greengrants Fund.15 Additional funds for critical items such as "education of the younger people, health facilities, economic opportunities for the islanders, and trauma counseling for the families that [we are] moving, as well as the host community" was not forthcoming from larger donors or PNG. 16 The bureaucracy and complexity of the process, for both international donors and the PNG government, have thousands of dollars earmarked for climate adaptation for the islands and atolls of rather than a "last resort" is important for a number of reasons. Notably, this framing may allow communities to access existing and ostensibly growing resources earmarked for adaptation. " Indeed, "[a] major obstacle to moving forward on the issue of guidance on planned relocations in the light of climate change is the lack of information on adaptation funding and the extent to which it might be available to support work on human mobility in general and planned relocations in par ticular. A critical funding shortfall remains, however, particularly for the most vulnerable communities within nation-states. It is widely acknowledged that miti gation and resilience-building require significant and diverse financial investments, from both public and private and domestic and international sources. Climate finance, therefore, will have twin mandates to provide high-quality funding to aid in limiting global temperature increases to 2° Celsius and to assist vulnerable com munities through adaptation and, perhaps over time, mitigating loss and damage. 22 All funds appear woefully undercapitalized, with potentially devastating impacts to both decarbonization and preparedness. Estimates for investments necessary to keep average global temperatures below 2° Celsius range from $0.6 trillion per year by 2020 to $1.5 trillion per year.23 For climate change adapta tion not necessarily including migration and loss and damage monies-annual investment estimates range from $49 billion to $171 billion.24 These estimates far exceed the aspirational goals of the international community to disburse $100 billion per year for both mitigation and adaptation by 2020.25 Current estimates of climate finance range from $340 billion to $650 billion per year.26 This short fall is more consequential for those who are climate displaced, like the Carteret Islanders. The funding gap occurs because "displaced persons and their home countries lack guaranteed financial and material assistance for resettlement."27 As noted previously by several researchers, absent international financing, "It seems unlikely that governments in many affected developing countries will have the necessary resources to plan and implement resettlement plans that uphold the rights of communities," especially because it is "precisely those governments that are likely to experience increased financial pressure on other fronts as a result of climate change (e.g., decline in tourism or fishing industries, lower tax revenues, and perhaps increased political turmoil)."28 C onceptual Shortfalls in C limate Finance H indering A daptation and M igration
The failings of climate finance management and disbursement exacerbate continued undercapitalization. At present, adaptation does not receive a sufficient share of the limited funds, and migration receives even less recognition and much less funding within the extant adaptation frameworks.29 In 2010, an additional funding source for climate adaptation was established in the form of the Green Climate Fund, supplementing existing institutional arrangements that disburse adaptation finance consistent with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).30 It was also the 2010 UNFCCC meetings in Cancun at which the international negotiations produced text acknowledging migration and the need for a management framework to address the phenomenon.31 There is, however, no widely recognized and agreed upon esti mate for the potential costs associated with climate migration, save for the discrete migration estimates of small island communities such as Choiseul and the Carterets.32 That this kind of migration occurs internally, rather than across international borders, will con tinue to confound the management and finance infrastructure that might respond to the necessary relocations. Such migrations are also highly likely to be expensive-stretched into the hundreds of mil lions, as estimated by the government of the Solomon Islands.33 Further, and perhaps most relevant to the present discussion, while most resilience-based efforts occur at the local level, there is an absence of com mitment and accompanying infrastructure at the international level to channel adaptation finance to local communities.34 The community level is the capacity at which contributions of women, indigenous peoples, and other especially vulnerable populations are most able to construct a plan for resilience and relocation that is consonant with their own conceptions of well-being and cultural survival. 35 To accelerate their relocation and establish a viable engine of economic development for well-being and self-reliance the Carteret Islanders, for example, founded Bougainville Cocoa Net Limited. The company grows and exports organic cocoa, sustaining family incomes and promising the eventual hope of suspending the pursuit of donor funds permanently.36 This kind of economic development is critical to the sound resettlement of communities, yet this can often be the hardest investment for which to find funding.37 To achieve durable solutions, however, "the availability of livelihoods and development oriented recovery activities" appear critical. 38 In sum, it is unknown if or how migration needs are factored into estimates of the cost of sound climate change adaptation. The fact that no single financial vehicle covers all climate-induced migration scenarios makes this all the more challenging.39 Though there are several existing finance mechanisms, the level of There is an absence of commitment and accompanying infrastructure at the international level to channel adaptation finance to local communities.
funding is not sufficient for current and future scenarios.40 Some scholars have argued for the creation of a new comprehensive, global funding mechanism to aid resettlement efforts, which would allocate countries' contributions based on common but differentiated responsibilities, taking into account each country's contribution to climate change and its capacity to pay. 41 Others argue that targeted regional responses, based on negotiations between states in the same region, may be more appropriate than a global response.42 Given the general lack of funding for resettlement, one scholar has contended that it may be better to strengthen existing adaptation funds rather than create an entirely new mechanism, which may end up reducing countries' contributions and even diluting the total assistance that developing countries receive.43 Whichever framework prevails, in order to work most effectively, financial institutions should seek to minimize bureaucracy and "avoid cumbersome rules of procedure that make it difficult to reach those who need help."44 Furthermore, if the most vulnerable are going to benefit directly from funding, it is essential that funding directives appropriately align with national, as well as local, communities' needs-namely sustainable economic development for long term self-sufficiency.
Much more is needed beyond the individual and ad hoc management for relo cation of affected communities, which are all currently underfunded. Indeed, the lack of capital makes it more important that the funds are used efficiently to build resilience at the local, national, and regional levels. The politics of climate finance and policymaking may, however, confound these efforts.
Political O pportunism in C limate R esponses
The friction between the Carteret Islanders and provincial and national gov ernments described above is not unique. In fact, the politicized nature of climate policy and finance and related fields-including urban planning and control, donor expenditures, and population consolidation plans, among others-reveal the existing and growing potential for indifference and, worse yet, malfeasance at the administrative level. Even absent malfeasance, insufficient information at the national level inhibits optimal resilience-building at the local level, all further militating in favor of funding for locally devised adaptation and relocation plans. 45 International climate finance has predominantly been funneled through national financial management systems.46 This top-down model ignores historical antagonisms between marginalized groups and governments and facilitates further marginalization through the execution of facially progressive climate policy. 47 Some scholars and researchers have identified instances in which the state allows climate-related risks to exist as part of larger, politically charged land use plan-ning. 48 Others recount the role of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) in facilitating state-sponsored dispossession of ancestral lands to access financial incentives for developing countries that reduce carbon emissions through forest conservation efforts. 49 Still others note that annual environmental funding runs close to $300 billion, but it remains unclear "how the money is spent."50 What appears evident, however, is that a bulk of available funding goes to governments as well as large corporations, and only a small portion ously unpopular resettlement and migration policies."53 The government of the Maldives, at times an important voice for the ethical implications of climateinduced migration, had earlier proposed, for ease of administration, the consolida tion of populations dispersed over 200 islands onto ten to fifteen islands. When introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s, the relocation proposal was widely unpopular, meeting "overwhelming resistance."54 Invoking an "environmental dis course," the Maldivian government has reintroduced these resettlement policies, buttressed by the "universal acceptance" of sea level rise. Environmental exigencies now fuel a plan that was once a strategy based on economic and political pressures. At best, mistrust of the government's current motives sullies the consolidation plans, with uncertain results. 55 Allusions to safety risks-supported by the complexity of climate science, in the purview of expert knowledge rather than purportedly less sophisticated local peoples-has served to advance political goals. This is just one of many instances in which government planning and local well-being can be misaligned, if not Thus far, this article has attempted to identify two significant gaps in the current funding infrastructure. In addition to the crippling underfunding of climate mitigation, particularly that of adaptation efforts, there is a constrained Mistrust of the government's of it reaches the most vulnerable communities it is meant to serve.51 consolidation with uncertain results.
current motives sullies the current Particularly relevant to migration due to climate change, some relocation policies demonstrate the ways in which top-down policies can obscure, if not completely contravene, the wishes of the local com munities.52 Looking closely at the Maldives, scholar Uma Kothari examines the "political imperatives that are influencing discussions of climate change and migration, and specifically how environmental discourses are being mobilized to reintroduce previwhollv at odds.
ADDRESSING GAPS THROUGH EXISTING FUNDS
interpretation of what qualifies as credible and relevant adaptation responses, which severely impacts relocating communities. This is the "funding gap" that omits funds for sound resettlement through economic development. There is also an absence of sizeable and consistent funds for community-level adaptation to local entities. This is the "political gap" that favors a top-down, national govern ment-oriented response over the more appropriate bottom-up, community-based, and community-responsive approach. There are possibilities to address these gaps in existing infrastructure, if appropriate attention is given to identifying these gaps and bridging them in a rigorous fashion.
The next two sections look at the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the Adaptation Fund for possible resolutions. 55 The last section con siders the role of alternative funding sources that might work in harmony with the above global funds.
A mending the Green Climate Fund
Given its stated ambition and that it is still in the development phase, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) provides a unique opportunity to address the above challenges through directed and purposeful policy. Established at the Cancun Climate Change Conference in 2010 as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC, the parties to the FJNFCCC intend for the GCF to serve as the centerpiece of efforts to raise $100 billion a year by 2020. 57 The GCF board recently agreed on how it will operate, who can distribute money from the fund, and how much control countries will have over funded projects. The fund's mandate is to play a key role "in channeling new, additional, adequate, and predictable financial resources to developing countries and will catalyze climate finance, both public and private, and at the international and national levels."58 It is the "epicenter" of twenty-first century climate finance that will determine "the direction of both public and private investment over the next decades," according to the executive secretary of the UNFCCC. 59 The GCF, as currently conceived, includes some promising elements from the vantage point of the climate displaced. The board determined that, over time, half of GCF funds will go to adaptation and half will go to mitigation, with half of the adaptation funds allocated to the most vulnerable nations.60 This rebalancing of funds allocation is significant, as adaptation efforts have been "structurally underfunded."61 Further, the GCF announced that it is working to increase access to funding for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the coming months through its readiness and preparatory support program. Thus far, SIDS' requests for readiness support have ranged from helping to create strategic frameworks for engagement with the fund to program development and meeting accreditation requirements for national implementing entities.62 Finally, and in an important nod to assisting historically vulnerable populations who have been less involved in decisionmaking, the GCF will assess social and economic co-benefits, as well as the gender-sensitivity of its investments. In general, and at least in stated intention, GCF investments have lofty and potentially game-changing aspirations.63
Country ownership is of particular importance in GCF administration. Mandated to be a central determinant of finance decisionmaking, the principle of country ownership is progressive in stated intention, but may have deleterious effects when considered alongside the political exigencies of migration and reloca tion. The principle reflects an important departure from the extant yet hidden system of climate finance in which donor governments dictate the terms for accessing funds.64 GCF affirmatively seeks to "promote and strengthen engage ment at the country level through effective involvement of relevant institutions and stakeholders."65 National Designating Authorities, or another agreed-upon country-level focal point, will determine modes of access and prioritize alloca tions of funds consistent with goals set at the national level. This is a welcomed departure from the paternalism that has characterized many international finance arrangements. It is also, however, a method that might further entrench existing indifference or antagonisms toward vulnerable, community-level populations on the part of national authorities, exemplified by the unexpected conflicts in the Maldives and the hurdles faced by the Carteret Islanders.
With a clear eye on the perils and possibilities of the GCF, a number of policy approaches might buffer against the political gaps that country ownership exacer bates and provide appropriate responses to the funding gap in an overall deficient funding landscape. With respect to country ownership, avenues that further enhance direct access to small, local, community-based NGOs could ease access to the GCF's financial support. As discussed further below, there is an existing infrastructure of grassroots grant-making organizations that can partner with and leverage GCF funding in a cost-effective manner. The GCF is also contemplating attracting other forms of finance, namely through the philanthropic sector.66 This vehicle may be the best way for consistent and increasing funding to reach effective and credible organizations led by and for the benefit of women, indigenous peoples, and other vulnerable communities, including those forced to relocate. Best P ractices from the A daptation Fund and the G lobal Environment Facility Community-based adaptation can address the concerns regarding locally responsive and supportive adaptation, and migration and relocation needs, and ensure the most impactful and expansive application of funds for greater resil-ience. There are important examples of this kind of funding that already exist. This section briefly outlines and introduces the most relevant elements of the Adaptation Fund and the Global Environment Facility.67 The latter is the most promising and instructive with respect to community-level support through its small grants programming. 68 Relevant to the present discussion, the Adaptation Fund has the specific mandate to finance adaptation with special atten tion promised to the most vulnerable communities. This mandate closely aligns the fund with the goals of more community-oriented approaches, at least in principle.69 It is financed by sales of certified emission reductions under the Clean Development Mechanism to governments, the private sector, and individuals. Over the past three years, the fund has dedicated more than $232 million to increase climate resilience in forty countries. It is still unclear whether migration will be a recognized adaptation strategy for purposes of funding. Notwithstanding that uncertainty, other concerns arise. Its "innovative" country ownership orienta tion makes it more susceptible to increasing the distance between local communi ties that may be at odds with their governments and still need funding. Indeed, direct access has operated via National Implementing Entities that reflect nationallevel priorities through devolved management powers.70 Again, this is a notable and innovative increase in state-level ownership of adaptation projects and programs, as accredited national entities supplant multilateral intermediaries.71 This is progress, to be sure. Without further refinement, it may also come with significant, nega tive effects and, at best, evade opportunities to redefine certain categories related to adaptation that will assist in-country communities that must relocate and seek economic development and self-sufficiency as they craft their resettlement.
For greater community-level, direct access that can better elicit diverse and responsive measures for relocation, the Global Environmental Facility's Small Grants Programme (GEF SPG) provides a promising template. The GEF became an official financial mechanism for the UNFCCC at the second Conference of the Parties (COP).7-The GEF manages two separate adaptation-focused funds under the UNFCCC-the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). Despite its mandate not to support adaptation projects, the GEF's SGP is most relevant as it has "emerged as a highly effective [funding] mechanism for delivering Community-Based Adaption (CBA) projects."73 Elements that make the GEF SGP a model for decentralized and community-driven funding It is still unclear whether or not migration will be a recognized adaptation strategy for purposes of funding.
include: the creation of national steering committees that comprised a majority of civil society organizations, government, the United Nations Development Programme, academia, and the private sector; development of a national strategy for achieving CBA objectives "based on local context and circumstances;" and, technical support for capacity building, among other things.74 Further, the GEF SGP has an established infrastructure to reach remote communities through sub regional mechanisms in addition to the National Steering Committee.75 Finally, as Fenton et al. note, the GEF SGP distributes initial grants of $5,000 for planning CBA projects, which "reduces the risks posed by immediately disbursing relatively large sums while improving the ability of communities to convene, discuss, and plan remedial actions and measures which can provide community-owned and implemented solutions."76 Indeed, this mirrors the exact kind of funding that was so consequential for the Carteret Islanders.
T he P romise of A lternative Funding Sources
While a number of proposed and often innovative funding sources exist, the potential transformative role of the philanthropic sector is important to note here.77 As introduced above, there is a significant opportunity to partner with and leverage existing philanthropic infrastructure, particularly for the provision of small grants. Independent charitable organizations can assist in ensuring efficient and impactful funding, with low transaction costs. The current network of organi zations operates in at least 100 countries, with direct grantmaking and a parallel emphasis on local capacity building.'8 A partnered approach is consistent with the GCF's own investment criteria, which includes decisions based on "the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed intervention, including its ability to leverage additional funding."79 The leveraging may be limited to the case of mitigation initially, but for optimal adaptation and relocation at the community level, an expansion of leveraging opportunities would be advantageous for the fund and those it seeks to aid.80
CONCLUSION
The Carteret Islanders will continue to chart their multi-year transition in the current funding landscape. This journey will occur at the same historical moment as the international community assembles its greatest climate finance structure to date and debates that structure's bedrock principles. The climate finance regimepublic or private-can benefit from observing and incorporating the lessons and experiences of the Carteret Islanders. Those facing relocation, a likely expanding number, clearly benefit from this purposeful observation.
The preeminent emerging climate finance vehicle has conflicting mandates.
The GCF must respect country ownership and a country-driven approach to climate finance. It must also remain sensitive to the most vulnerable. , 2010) , 81. While not nation-states, a number of Pacific island com munities are experiencing dislocation because of diminishing inhabitability of their islands. Regarding the terms used to describe those displaced, there is no universally agreed-upon definition for each. "Climate refugees" has been the most widely used term in popular discourse. From a law and policy standpoint, however, the term "refugee" is not an accurate reflection of the current legal status of these kinds of migrants. In fact, those dislocated due to impacts reasonably related to climate change have no legal status at all. As a result, scholars, researchers, and some political voices employ proxy terms such as "climate migrants" or "the climate displaced." Climate Finance -Road to Paris (2014) , http://roadtoparis.info/top-list/10-climate-change-controversies-now-that-cause-settled/climate-finance/ (citing an aggregation by the South Centre, a developing country think tank). !l Agreement, 14(f). "Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and cir cumstances, by undertaking, inter alia, the following... (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordi nation, and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional, and international levels." Only a small number of countries have incorporated planned relocation into their national plans for adaptation. Rowling. Colombia is the first South American nation to include migration in its national climate change policy and Fiji is finalizing guidelines for planned relocation. , there is a risk that climate finance will continue to support top-down, centralized activities that may struggle to address the needs of vulnerable communities."); Teresa Odendahl, "Women on climate change frontline make big impact on small grants, Guardian, 28 November 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/nov/28/cop21-women-climate-change-frontline-small-grants-mama-aleta-baun-west-timor, (arguing that, "Despite leading some of the boldest and most successful climate projects, however, they receive little attention and scant backing from typical funders and climate
